By Segun Adediran
On November 17th, the Ogun State Governor, Dapo Abiodun, hosted Southern Governors and members of the Southern Nigeria Traditional Rulers Council to discuss regional security, governance, and development. This was expected.
What was not expected was the hypocritical passing of a vote of confidence in President Bola Tinubu, especially as they noted, “in stabilising the economy, improving governance, and advancing key infrastructure projects across the country.”
As if that was not embarrassing enough, they were reported to have “reiterated their long-standing advocacy for a Southern presidency, stating that the region remains committed to equity, balance, and national cohesion.” Not now! There must be a country to govern first before the 2027 elections.
But encouragingly, former President Olusegun Obasanjo came out with uncommon candour on Nigerian security challenges. One of his strikingly honest messages was this: “If we are being killed, it is the responsibility of the government to do something about it. The government should stop the killing of Nigerians, no matter what religion they belong to, no matter what part of the world they belong to, no matter what tribe they belong to.” I agree.
Before Obasanjo, Donald Trump, the United States President, had every reason to be angry. During his first term, his government had sold munitions, precision bombs, precision rockets, and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$346 million. This was followed by another $997 million package approved in 2022, which included 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters.
I am worried, and deeply so, that there is so much hypocrisy in Nigeria. It is concerning that everyone who has a voice wants to be politically correct, even when floods of innocent blood run across their secure homes. There is a snake on the Nigerian roof. My research shows that the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and its more deadly jihadist ally, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), are both consolidating and expanding their bloody presence into northern Togo, Benin, and Nigeria’s Sokoto region. For years, the ideological threat of Salafi-Jihadism—embodied chiefly by Boko Haram and its more sophisticated splinter, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)—was geographically sequestered to Nigeria’s North-East.
This localisation allowed the South to operate under the perilous assumption of immunity. However, recent, undeniable incursions and the observed strategic expansion of these groups toward the central and littoral states of West Africa have shattered that illusion.
Preventing the establishment of a formal jihadist presence in Southern Nigeria is no longer a peripheral security concern; it is the most critical strategic defence for the future economic and political integrity of the entire nation.
The jihadist threat to the South is not a direct, frontal military invasion. Instead, it is an opportunistic infection that targets existing systemic security weaknesses. The South is targeted for three main reasons: economic resources, high-value symbolic targets, and strategic evasion.
The oil-producing regions provide the vast majority of government revenue, and disrupting these facilities, as seen in the recent targeting of infrastructure near the Niger-Nigeria border, offers maximum economic warfare leverage.
Furthermore, attacking Christian populations and high-profile targets in the predominantly Christian South serves the global Islamic State “core” directive, garnering international attention and demonstrating operational reach beyond the Lake Chad Basin.
The most immediate danger lies in the convergence of existing criminal networks with ideological extremism. Southern Nigeria is already battling rampant kidnapping for ransom, resurgent Niger Delta militancy, and the increasing violence associated with armed banditry. These criminal enterprises share methods—extortion, illicit trafficking, and disruption of state authority—with terrorist groups, even if their motives are purely financial.
The search results indicate that jihadist groups thrive by exploiting areas where communities compete over access to natural resources or political power, often embedding themselves within existing inter-group disputes, such as those between herder and farmer communities that have crept southward.
This creates a security vacuum where a symbiotic relationship can form: bandits provide tactical expertise, weaponry, and local logistics, while jihadists inject a powerful, justifying ideology, discipline, and transnational funding.
To preempt this dangerous alliance, the Nigerian government must pursue a strategy that criminalises and decapitates the existing banditry networks immediately, denying them the capacity to be co-opted. This requires massive, sustained investment in intelligence gathering that maps the illicit financial flow—from ransom payment to arms purchase—and treats organised kidnapping not as a common crime but as a national security threat that serves as a potential vector for radicalisation.
The Obasanjo strategy is clear: “Now we have capacity. With drones, you can flip them off. You can take them out. Why are we not doing that? Why are we apologising? Why are we negotiating?”
The extensive, porous Southern coastline and its dense forest reserves are critical logistical weak points. The search confirms the expansion of militant groups southward through borderlands and supply corridors. The forests of the South-West and South-South, previously used for illegal logging and refuge by local criminal gangs, are increasingly becoming temporary staging grounds and training camps for armed non-state actors who move from the Middle Belt.
Deploying sophisticated satellite and drone surveillance technology, especially along known criminal hideouts, is vital. Given ISWAP’s increasing use of weaponised drones, the Federal Government must establish regional air superiority and counter-drone capabilities immediately.
Large-scale, sustained clearing and monitoring operations are necessary to permanently dismantle entrenched camps within the vast forest reserves.
These operations must be multi-agency, involving the Nigerian military, forestry services, and local vigilante forces familiar with the terrain.
The failure of the state to provide security and justice is a powerful driver of extremism. When perpetrators of violence—be they bandits, armed herders, or identified militants—operate with impunity, it undermines trust in government and encourages self-determination movements, which further fracture the security landscape.
Swift, transparent, and legally grounded prosecution of all captured terrorists and criminals is essential to restore public faith in the rule of law.
Preventing jihadist terror from finding a permanent home in Southern Nigeria requires a comprehensive, all-of-nation strategy. It must be kinetic in neutralising existing criminal networks and technological in dominating the physical domains of forest and sea.
We must recognise that the failure to secure the North is a threat to the South.
Adediran writes via segunadediran2002ng@yahoo.com
